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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• This paper outlines the opportunities of and challenges in using cyber 
insurance to incentivise cyber security practices. Findings are based 
on a review of existing industry reports and academic research. 
• The paper forms part of an independent research project by 
RUSI and the University of Kent that provides actionable policy 
recommendations on how to incentivise cyber security through cyber 
insurance. They derive from a series of interviews and workshops 
with insurers, businesses, cyber security providers, government and 
other key stakeholders. 
• The current evidence about the ability of cyber insurance to improve 
cyber security practices is limited. While cyber insurers may be able 
to provide expertise to policyholders and increase their awareness of 
cyber risks, much of the existing evidence base is largely theoretical 
and there is still considerable scepticism from customers about the 
benefits of cyber insurance. 
• The uptake of cyber insurance, particularly by small to medium 
enterprises (SMEs), remains low. Existing research suggests that some 
of the overarching factors explaining this are: the high cost of policies 
and the difficulties insurers face in pricing premiums appropriately; 
confusion over what types of incidents insurance policies cover 
(and the issue of ‘silent cyber’); and a lack of understanding of risks 
stemming from cyber incidents.
• There is the potential for the cyber insurance market to learn from 
other insurance markets to increase uptake, although understanding 
the depth of these connections requires further enquiry. 
• The paper concludes by identifying several policy questions raised by 
the existing literature. These questions serve to guide the next stage 
of the project and to prompt new conversations about how cyber 
insurance might better incentivise cyber security practices. 
INTRODUCTION
In April 2020, reports emerged that Travelex had paid a ransom of $2.3 million 
to restore its services after a crippling ransomware attack.1 Initially, the 
company claimed that its cyber insurance policy, designed to cover business 
liability from the impact of cyber incidents, would cover a large part of these 
outgoings. However, the extent to which the policy covered the company’s 
losses from the ransomware attack remains unclear.2 Travelex has never 
stated what sort of policy it has or how much of its losses were covered. In 
August 2020, Travelex went into administration. The administrators said the 
1. Doug Olenick, ‘Travelex Paid $2.3 Million Ransom, Report’, SC Magazine, 10 April 
2020, <https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security%20-news/ransomware/
travelex-paid-2-3-million-ransom-report/>, accessed 9 November 2020. 
2. Robin Pagnamenta, ‘Daring $6m Cyber-Heist Could be the Least of Travelex’s 
Woes’, The Telegraph, 9 January 2020.
SULLIVAN AND NURSE 3
impact of this cyber incident, coupled with the coronavirus pandemic, had 
acutely impacted the business.3 This case study raises two important points 
relating to cyber security incentives and the role of cyber insurance. First, 
the extent to which Travelex’s policy covered its losses from the ransomware 
attack was never disclosed publicly – a fact that promotes perceptions of 
cyber insurance being a secretive market where pay-outs are hard to 
unlock.4 Second, there is no information in the public domain regarding the 
intricacies of Travelex’s cyber insurance policy and whether it directly or 
indirectly encouraged good cyber behaviours or not.
This case could prove to be significant in the context of cyber security and cyber 
insurance. Remote working, rapid digitalisation and the need for increased 
connectivity have already made cyber risk an increasingly significant concern 
for organisations around the globe.5 The impact of these overarching trends 
has been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic.6 At the same time, the 
frequency and intensity of targeted ransomware operations have started to 
change cyber risk calculations within businesses.7 Not only are the number 
of ransomware attacks increasing, but the payments demanded by attackers 
are also going up.8 The threat of financial loss from these new types of 
cyber risk has brought cyber insurance to the forefront of many companies’ 
agendas.9 For example, more recently, there have been concerns from the 
US Treasury about cyber insurers paying ransomware demands.10
3. Kalyeena Makortoff, ‘Travelex Falls into Administration, With Loss of 1,300 Jobs’, 
The Guardian, 6 August 2020. 
4. Pagnamenta, ‘Daring $6m Cyber-Heist Could be the Least of Travelex’s Woes’. 
5. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), ‘Joint CISA and UK Tip 
on COVID-19 Cyber Threat Exploitation’, 5 May 2020, <https://www.cisa.gov/
publication/joint-cisa-and-uk-tip-covid-19-cyber-threat-exploitation>, accessed  
8 September 2020. 
6. Robert Ackerman Jr, ‘The COVID-19 Pandemic and Other Issues Are Stressing 
Corporate Cyber-Risk Management’, RSA Conference, 13 August 2020, <https://
www.rsaconference.com/industry-topics/blog/the-covid-19-pandemic-and-other-
issues-are-stressing-corporate-cyber-risk-managem>, accessed 9 October 2020. 
7. Nathaniel Popper, ‘Ransomware Attacks Grow; Crippling Cities and Businesses’, 
New York Times, 9 February 2020.
8. Sarah Coble, ‘Ransomware Payments on the Rise’, Infosecurity Magazine, 1 April 
2020, <https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/rise-in-ransomware-
payments/>, accessed 6 November 2020.
9. Joanne Cracknell and Shauna McAuley, ‘Cyber Security Risks During a Pandemic’, 
Willis Towers Watson, 22 July 2020, <https://www.willistowerswatson.com/
en-GB/Insights/2020/07/cyber-security-risks-during-a-pandemic>, accessed  
7 November 2020. 
10. Andrew G Simpson, ‘U.S. Treasury Warns Cyber Insurers Against Paying 
Ransomware Demands’, Insurance Journal, 1 October 2020, <https://www.
insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/10/01/584906.htm>, accessed  
6 November 2020. 
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The RUSI Cyber Research team has partnered with the University of Kent 
as part of a one-year project, ‘Incentivising Cybersecurity through Cyber 
Insurance’ (ICCI). It aims to explore why organisations, particularly SMEs, may 
or may not feel compelled to introduce sufficient cyber risk-management 
measures to protect against cyber threats. In particular, the project focuses 
on the potential relationship between cyber insurance and organisations’ 
cyber security practices. The research will analyse the extent to which cyber 
insurance could encourage better cyber risk-management practices. A key 
focus of the research is whether it is possible for cyber insurance to adopt 
lessons from other mature insurance sectors regarding how they incentivise 
secure behaviours. This research is funded by the National Cyber Security 
Centre (NCSC), in collaboration with the Research Institute in Sociotechnical 
Cyber Security (RISCS).
This Emerging Insights paper sets out some key policy gaps relating to 
cyber security incentives and the role of cyber insurance. Findings derive 
from an extensive review of existing material – from industry, government 
and academia – relating to cyber insurance, cyber security and cyber risk 
management. The paper is divided into four sections: first, it describes 
the nascent cyber insurance market; second, it assesses the role of cyber 
insurance in improving security behaviours and the challenges it faces in 
achieving this goal; third, it highlights other sectors that the cyber insurance 
market could learn from; and fourth, it poses a series of policy questions 
that should inform the direction of further research, including the research 
project’s enquiries. 
This paper offers preliminary insights based solely on a review of the 
existing body of literature, rather than the project’s ongoing fieldwork. That 
fieldwork will feed into the wider project, including a policy research paper 
due for publication in early March 2021. That phase will provide actionable 
recommendations based on in-depth primary research with practitioners 
and policymakers from across government, academia and industry, including 
a large number of cyber security professionals and cyber insurers. 
WHAT IS CYBER INSURANCE? 
Cyber insurance allows companies to transfer some of the financial risk 
associated with cyber incidents to an insurer.11 It is intended to cover 
business liability, including first-party costs, and is often presented 
as a critical component of cyber risk-management approaches within 
organisations. However, insurance companies include extra services for 
their customers that are intended to improve cyber security approaches 
within an organisation. Such services are in the interest of the insurance 
company, as they are intended to improve an insurer’s risk profile. They 
run the gamut from initial evaluations of cyber security vulnerabilities and 
11. Lawrence A Gordon, Martin P Loeb and Tashfeen Sohail, ‘A Framework for Using 
Insurance for Cyber-Risk Management’, Communications of the ACM (Vol. 46, 
No. 3, March 2003), pp. 81–85. 
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access to consultancies to improve their overall cyber security posture, to a 
range of services to support companies in the event of an incident.
Because of this, some governments around the world have sought to 
explore the role that cyber insurance could play in incentivising better 
cyber security behaviours. The UK’s NCSC, for example, recently released 
detailed guidance on how companies should go about purchasing cyber 
insurance.12 It highlights seven cyber security questions that businesses 
should consider before buying insurance.13 However, insufficient conclusive 
research has been conducted to adequately explore whether or not cyber 
insurance does produce such positive cyber security outcomes. As it is a 
relatively new offering for insurance companies, insurers in recent years 
have spent a great deal of time clarifying what cyber insurance is, what it 
does and does not cover, and how to best build profitable portfolios. Some 
of those issues are covered in this section. In addition, there are further 
questions about the purpose of cyber insurance, how it functions in practice 
and the unique challenges it faces to become a fully mature insurance sector 
with high uptake. 
It is important to note that cyber insurance can typically be purchased as 
either a standalone cyber policy or as part of a wider insurance package 
that manages other risks. A dedicated cyber insurance policy is often more 
expensive, but also may offer higher pay-out limits should an incident 
occur.14 This kind of policy is also more likely to include the cyber risk 
tools that are intended to improve cyber security within an organisation.15 
Meanwhile, cyber insurance policies that are part of a broader package can 
be an attractive proposition in terms of simplicity and affordability.16
WHY IS UPTAKE SO LOW? 
Cyber insurance uptake has increased over the years within large businesses, 
particularly in the US and the UK. However, market growth has not met 
12. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), ‘Cyber Insurance Guidance’, 6 August 
2020, <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/cyber-insurance-guidance>, accessed 
6 November 2020. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Julie Bernard, ‘Overcoming Challenges to Cyber Insurance Growth: Expanding 
Stand-Alone Policy Adoption Among Middle Market Business’, Deloitte, 16 March 
2020, <https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/financial-services/
cyber-insurance-market-growth.html>, accessed 6 November 2020. 
15. CISA, ‘Cybersecurity Insurance’, <https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-
insurance>, accessed 9 November 2020. 
16. Bernard, ‘Overcoming Challenges to Cyber Insurance Growth’. 
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expected rates.17 The lack of uptake is particularly low among SMEs.18 As of 
the 2020 UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey, the UK government estimated 
that approximately 4% of businesses overall have a specific cyber insurance 
policy, and only 28% have cyber risks covered as part of a wider insurance 
policy.19 For ‘micro’ firms, the percentage dropped to 2% having a specific 
cyber insurance policy.20 
One potential explanation for this is the perceived high cost of such insurance 
policies and the willingness of companies to invest in them.21 Appropriately 
pricing cyber insurance products has been a key limiting factor for the 
market.22 Part of the challenge in pricing premiums relates to how exactly 
insurers should calculate cyber risk.23 As cyber attacks are a relatively new 
phenomenon, compared to hurricanes or earthquakes, there is a distinct 
lack of data about the frequency or impact of cyber incidents. In particular, 
there is limited data about the true financial implications of a cyber incident, 
particularly given the rate at which the nature and severity of incidents can 
change.24 Moreover, the constantly evolving nature of cyber risks makes it 
difficult to project what coverage may be required in the coming years, or 
even months.25 Due to this lack of data, insurers may struggle to accurately 
price their premiums in a way that appeals to both their appetite for risk 
and their customers’ spending preferences. They may also struggle to 
articulate the quantitative benefits of insurance to potential customers in a 
straightforward and transparent manner.26 
The difficulty of assessing the quantitative benefits of cyber insurance can be 
exacerbated by a widespread lack of understanding about what events cyber 
insurance could cover. Companies are often unsure of just what claims their 
17. Accenture, ‘The Global Future of Cyber Insurance – and the London Market’s 
Pivotal Role’, 2019, <https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/assets/Business/cyber-
insurance-report.pdf>, accessed 9 November 2020.
18. Hiscox, ‘Hiscox Cyber Readiness Report 2019’, April 2019, <https://www.hiscox.
co.uk/sites/uk/files/documents/2019-04/Hiscox_Cyber_Readiness_Report_2019.
PDF>, accessed 9 November 2020.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid. 
21. Bernard, ‘Overcoming Challenges to Cyber Insurance Growth’. 
22. Marsh and Microsoft, ‘By the Numbers: Global Cyber Risk Perception Survey 
2018’, February 2018, <https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/research/global-
cyber-risk-perception-survey.html>, accessed 20 June 2020.
23. Marsh and Microsoft, ‘2019 Global Cyber Risk Perception Survey’, September 
2019, <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Marsh-Microsoft-2019-Global-Cyber-Risk-Perception-Survey.pdf>, accessed  
9 November 2020. 
24. Jason R C Nurse et al., ‘The Data That Drives Cyber Insurance: A Study into the 
Underwriting and Claims Processes’, paper presented at IEEE Cyber Science 2020, 
International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness (online), June 2020.
25. Bernard, ‘Overcoming Challenges to Cyber Insurance Growth’.
26. Sachin Shetty et al., ‘Reducing Informational Disadvantages to Improve Cyber 
Risk Management’, The Geneva Papers (Vol. 43, 2018), pp. 224–38. 
The constantly 
evolving nature of 
cyber risks makes it 
difficult to project 
what coverage may 
be required in the 
coming years, or 
even months 
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insurance will include. Reasons to make a claim can range from human error 
to being collateral damage from hostile state aggression.27 Some businesses 
incorrectly think that other insurance classes will cover the losses from a 
cyber incident.28 The nascency of the industry makes it difficult to point to 
prior case studies of an incident and subsequent pay-outs. Industry figures 
from Britain suggest that cyber insurers do pay out most of the time, with 
the Association of British Insurers estimating that their members paid out 
99% of claims in 2018.29 This figure is based on 207 cyber claims made and 
settled in 2018.30 This is considered to be one of the highest acceptance rates 
on claims across the insurance industry.31 It contrasts sharply with reporting 
in the US, where the Association of Insurance Commissioners found that of 
9,107 claims in 2017 only 28.4% resulted in a payment.32 The lack of concrete 
evidence either way points to the perception problem that cyber insurers 
have regarding claims payments. High-profile coverage of incidents in which 
insurance companies have not paid out continues to contribute to a popular 
impression that cyber insurance companies do not pay out.33 
In addition, many companies do not realise how vulnerable they are to 
cyber risks and therefore conclude that a cyber insurance policy is not cost 
effective.34 The intangible nature of a cyber incident makes it difficult for 
potential customers to weigh up the value of cyber insurance as compared 
to the benefits of fire or flood insurance.35 Surveys show that companies 
often purchase cyber insurance in a reactive way after a significant incident 
that has either affected them or one of their close competitors.36 This 
27. CISA, ‘Cybersecurity Insurance’. 
28. Arthur J Gallagher, ‘“Silent” Cyber Risk Leaving Millions of UK Businesses 
Underinsured’, 5 February 2020, <https://www.ajg.com/uk/news-and-
insights/2020/february/silent-cyber-risk/>, accessed 7 November 2020; Marsh 
and Microsoft, ‘2019 Global Cyber Risk Perception Survey’. 
29. Association of British Insurers, ‘Cyber Insurance Payout Rates at 99%, But Uptake Still 
Far Too Low’, 8 August 2019, <https://www.abi.org.uk/news/news-articles/2019/08/
cyber-insurance-payout-rates-at-99-but-uptake-still-far-too-low/>, accessed  
6 November 2020. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
32. CISA, ‘Assessment of the Cyber Insurance Market’, July 2019, p. 5. 
33. Sarah Stephens, ‘How Cyber Insurance Can Still Leave You Vulnerable to Risks’, 
Computer Fraud and Security (Vol. 2020, No. 2, February 2020), pp. 2–4; Phil 
Muncaster, ‘Zurich Refuses to Pay Out for NotPetya “Act of War”’, Infosecurity 
Magazine, 11 January 2019, <https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/
zurich-refuses-to-pay-out-for/>, accessed 6 November 2020; Lisa Vaas, ‘We 
Don’t Cover Stupid, Says Cyber Insurer That’s Fighting a Payout’, Naked Security, 
28 May 2015, <https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/05/28/we-dont-cover-
stupid-says-cyber-insurer-thats-fighting-a-payout/>, accessed 6 November 2020. 
34. Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), ‘Cyber Security 
Breaches Survey 2019’, 2 July 2019, p. 25. 
35. Stephens, ‘How Cyber Insurance Can Still Leave You Vulnerable to Risks’. 
36. Bernard, ‘Overcoming Challenges to Cyber Insurance Growth’. 
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suggests that a lack of cyber awareness is a big factor in the lack of uptake.37 
However, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its resulting 
fines are also thought to have helped to make the risks of cyber breaches 
more tangible.38
From the difficulty of calculating premiums, uncertainty around coverage, 
concerns insurers will not pay out after an incident and a low perception 
of risk among businesses, it is easy to understand why cyber insurance 
uptake has been much lower than was expected by the cyber community.39 
Although companies repeatedly state that cyber risks and incidents rank 
among their top concerns, the cyber insurance industry still needs to build 
trust in its products and better demonstrate the benefits (some of which 
relate to security). These are some of the reasons why cyber insurance 
uptake has been so low to date.40
CAN CYBER INSURANCE IMPROVE SECURITY 
PRACTICES? 
Cyber insurers have a financial interest in reducing the number of cyber 
incidents to avoid claims, as well as mitigating the impact of events in order 
to limit the amount they must pay out to clients. While most organisations 
see cyber incidents as a low-probability, high-impact event, research 
revealed that cyber insurers address such incidents regularly as part of their 
business model.41 Some invest in full-time cyber security professionals to 
advise clients on the best ways to mitigate their exposure to cyber risks.42 
For SMEs, these services often prove too expensive to recruit in-house. 
Cyber insurers therefore can help to identify particular experts to mitigate 
risk.43 Insurers can quickly assemble teams with relevant expertise to 
support their clients before, during and after an incident.44 This includes 
forensics teams and breach counsel,45 and public relations and other cyber 
crisis responders.46 Companies can often gain access – for example, free 
access or direction to key services – to these resources through their cyber 
37. Ibid. 
38. Marsh and Microsoft, ‘2019 Global Cyber Risk Perception Survey’, p. 24. 
39. Ibid., pp. 22–30. 
40. Ibid.; CISA, ‘Cybersecurity Insurance’. 
41. HM Government, ‘UK Cyber Security: The Role of Insurance in Managing and 
Mitigating the Risk’, March 2015, p. 3.
42. Ibid. 
43. Daniel W Woods and Tyler Moore, ‘Does Insurance Have a Future in Governing 
Cybersecurity?’, Security and Privacy (Vol. 18, No. 1, 2020), pp. 21–27; Marsh 
and Microsoft, ‘2019 Global Cyber Risk Perception Survey’. 
44. HM Government, ‘UK Cyber Security’, p. 17. 
45. DCMS, ‘Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2020’, 26 March 2020, p. 25. 
46. Richard Knight and Jason R C Nurse, ‘A Framework for Effective Corporate 
Communication After Cyber Security Incidents’, Computers and Security (Vol. 99, 
December 2020). 
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insurance policy.47 A pertinent, and somewhat unclear, question that arises 
here is the extent to which organisations remain covered if they fail to adopt 
the practices suggested by insurers.
Some experts argue that cyber insurance encourages companies to assess 
their exposure to cyber risk.48 For example, cyber insurers can help to raise 
awareness around risk management by introducing clear benchmarks for 
companies seeking to improve their cyber security.49 Insurance companies 
can also increase companies’ understanding of their exposure and support 
them by continuously assessing the risks they face.50 The expertise and 
awareness that cyber insurance companies offer can increase knowledge 
about appropriate risk mitigation measures. 
This expertise includes consolidated information and data. Cyber insurers 
collect a significant pool of data about the types of cyber risk companies face. 
In doing so, they would be well equipped to put together comprehensive 
models that explain, and even quantify, elements of cyber risk.51 These 
models can help to determine what measures might be most effective, 
although the dynamic nature of the field and the shifting threat landscape 
make collecting up-to-date data an enduring challenge.52 There have already 
been initiatives by insurers – such as Cyber Catalyst by Marsh53 – to define 
cyber products that are perceived as effective at reducing cyber risk.
Insurance can also make the risks from poor cyber security more 
quantifiable. Insurance requirements help to ensure that initial measures 
are not a one-time expenditure, but rather are reviewed and renewed as 
necessary to comply with contractual obligations.54 Companies can be 
incentivised to introduce cyber controls to avoid the potential financial loss 
as a consequence of neglecting certain safety measures that are required by 
insurers.55 The topic of ransomware and payments to cyber-criminals is also 
pertinent to discussions on cyber insurance, given the ongoing deliberations 
regarding whether ransomware payments facilitated by cyber insurers are 
47. Sauhin A Talesh, ‘Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance 
Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Business’, Law and Social Inquiry 
(Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 2018), p. 417. 
48. OECD, ‘Enhancing the Role of Insurance in Cyber Risk Management’, December 
2017, p. 7.
49. Ibid.
50. Accenture, ‘The Global Future of Cyber Insurance – and the London Market’s 
Pivotal Role’, p. 12.
51. Gordon, Loeb and Sohail, ‘A Framework for Using Insurance for Cyber-Risk 
Management’, p. 82. 
52. Nurse et al., ‘The Data That Drives Cyber Insurance’.
53. Marsh, ‘Cyber Catalyst 2020 Risk Outlook’, March 2020. 
54. Woods and Moore, ‘Does Insurance Have a Future in Governing Cybersecurity?’, 
p. 22.
55. Gordon, Loeb and Sohail, ‘A Framework for Using Insurance for Cyber-Risk 
Management’, p. 82. 
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leading to an increasing number of ransomware attacks.56 Such notions 
have also fuelled wider concerns from parties including the US Treasury.57
This paper showcases existing literature that looks at how cyber insurance 
could significantly increase cyber security and resilience. One development 
in the field is the belief that insurance is fundamental to cyber risk 
management.58 This model advocates a balance between security controls 
and insurance to allow cyber risk to be reduced to acceptable levels for 
both the organisation and the insurer. However, there are still sceptics who 
believe that the role of cyber insurance in cyber risk management has been 
overplayed and will remain limited.59 
One area that requires further examination is the varying approaches that 
cyber insurers may take to assess cyber risk within organisations. While some 
may take a high-level strategic approach to risk management (such as audits 
or questionnaires), including the use of a variety of cyber risk-management 
frameworks,60 other cyber insurers may take a more technical deep dive 
into the risk held within an organisation. An in-depth understanding of this 
nuance is missing in the literature. The different services cyber insurers 
provide to assess cyber risk matters. They will clearly have an impact on the 
types of secure behaviours adopted by organisations. 
CYBER INSURANCE SCEPTICISM 
Case studies of positive cyber insurance outcomes are limited. The existing 
evidence base is largely theoretical and assumes that taking out a policy will 
result in improved cyber security behaviours. Sceptics can point to low cyber 
insurance uptake, ambiguity around defining ‘good’ security behaviours, the 
incentives for insurers to lower prices and requirements, and the potential 
for cyber insurance to promote poor security behaviours. 
56. Marsh, ‘Cyber Insurance Is Supporting the Fight Against Ransomware’, October 
2019, <https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/research/cyber-insurance-
supporting-fight-against-ransomware.html>, accessed 9 November 2020. 
57. Simpson, ‘U.S. Treasury Warns Cyber Insurers Against Paying Ransom Demands’.
58. Gordon, Loeb and Sohail, ‘A Framework for Using Insurance for Cyber-Risk 
Management’, pp. 81–85. 
59. Walter S Baer and Andrew Parkinson, ‘Cyberinsurance in IT Security 
Management’, Security and Privacy (Vol. 5, No. 3, May/June 2007), pp. 50–56; 
Inger Anne Tøndel et al., ‘Using Cyber-Insurance as a Risk Management Strategy: 
Knowledge Gaps and Recommendations for Further Research’, SINTEF,  
11 November 2015, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/52131083.pdf>, accessed 
18 June 2020. 
60. Daniel Woods et al., ‘Mapping the Coverage of Security Controls in Cyber Insurance 
Proposal Forms’, Journal of Internet Services and Applications (Vol. 8, 2017).
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As mentioned, cyber insurance uptake has been much lower than predicted. 
This is a particular concern for SMEs.61 The cost of a policy can be a 
deterrent for businesses. Although insurers offer discounts if a company 
demonstrates good cyber security behaviours, they are often dwarfed by 
the price of the overall premium.62 Organisations may see the price of a 
policy and (often incorrectly) assess that their cyber risk is not high enough 
to justify the outlay. 
There is also ambiguity over what constitutes ‘good’ cyber security behaviours. 
Cyber security standards63 play a role in how policies are underwritten and 
what controls organisations introduce to improve their cyber security.64 Yet, 
different cyber insurers require different security controls to underwrite a 
policy.65 There is a range of formal frameworks, such as the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and the 
UK’s Cyber Essentials.66 While there are commonalities across standards, 
controls also vary, especially with regard to the metrics used to measure 
success.67 Cyber Essentials is a well-known UK government-backed scheme, 
but some argue that it is merely a ‘box-ticking’ exercise in cyber security 
which could lead to sub-optimal cyber security outcomes.68
Another concern relates to market incentives and to what extent cyber 
insurers adequately analyse customers’ cyber security posture prior to 
offering coverage.69 As the cyber insurance market continues to grow, 
insurers face increasing competition for customers and such dynamics could 
cause companies to lower the price of their products. Lower prices could lead 
to a decrease in requirements (namely, evidence of security controls) and a 
lower threshold to obtain a policy.70 In this scenario, there is less incentive 
61. Hiscox, ‘Hiscox Cyber Readiness Report 2019’, p. 2.
62. Woods and Moore, ‘Does Insurance Have a Future in Governing Cybersecurity?’, 
p. 23.
63. See, for example, NIST, ‘Cybersecurity Framework’, <https://www.nist.gov/
cyberframework>, accessed 10 November 2020; ISO, ‘Popular Standards: ISO/IEC 
27001 Information Security Management’, <https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-
information-security.html>, accessed 13 November 2020; NCSC, ‘Cyber Essentials’, 
<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/overview>, accessed 10 November 2020.
64. See, for example, Marsh, ‘Cyber Catalyst 2020 Risk Outlook’.
65. Woods et al., ‘Mapping the Coverage of Security Controls in Cyber Insurance 
Proposal Forms’, p. 1. 
66. NIST, ‘Cybersecurity Framework’; NCSC, ‘Cyber Essentials’. 
67. Woods and Moore, ‘Does Insurance Have a Future in Governing Cybersecurity?’, 
p. 23.
68. Christopher Decker, ‘Goals-Based and Rules-Based Approaches to Regulation’, 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), BEIS Research 
Paper No. 8, May 2018. 
69. Woods and Moore, ‘Does Insurance Have a Future in Governing Cybersecurity?’, 
p. 23.
70. Nurse et al., ‘The Data That Drives Cyber Insurance’.
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for insurers to encourage better cyber security behaviours,71 while insurers 
who do not lower their prices may be uncertain of making a profit.72 This 
phenomenon is colloquially referred to as a ‘race to the bottom’.
Some argue that taking out a cyber insurance policy could actually discourage 
secure behaviours, a concept known as ‘moral hazard’.73 Several studies 
have found that organisations are less likely to invest in risk prevention if 
they think that their cyber insurance policy will resolve (and/or cover the 
cost of) an incident anyway.74 The moral hazard phenomenon, which argues 
that protected groups could take on more risk, is true for the insurance 
sector as a whole.75 It has the potential to drive up insurance premiums, 
placing an increased financial burden on companies who invest in preventive 
measures, as well as insurance.76 Another complexity is the uncertainty 
around security controls more broadly, and the reality that little is ultimately 
known about what the most effective security controls at mitigating cyber 
risk are today.77 Therefore, insurers may themselves be unclear about what 
controls to require to prevent moral hazard concerns.
Another area of contention relates to what extent governments should 
intervene in the cyber insurance industry to increase national cyber 
resilience. One drastic intervention would make cyber insurance mandatory, 
putting it on the same statutory footing as car and employee liability 
insurance. Other interventions could include mandating specified security 
standards or standardising language in cyber insurance policies to simplify 
understanding. The UK government has already explored some soft 
interventions. For example, the NCSC recently released a guide to purchasing 
71. Nikhil Shetty et al., ‘Competitive Cyber-Insurance and Internet Security’, in 
Tyler Moore, David Pym and Christos Ioannidis (eds), Economics of Information 
Security and Privacy (Berlin: Springer, 2010), pp. 229–47. 
72. Ranjan Pal et al., ‘Will Cyber-Insurance Improve Network Security? A 
Market Analysis’, in IEEE INFOCOM 2014 – IEEE Conference on Computer 
Communications, Toronto, 27 April–2 May 2014, <http://bourbon.usc.edu/
leana/papers/PalGPH14.pdf>, accessed 10 November 2020. 
73. Liam M D Bailey, ‘Mitigating Moral Hazard in Cyber-Risk Insurance’, Journal of 
Law and Cyber Warfare (Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2014), pp. 1–42. 
74. Kai-Lung Hui, Wendy Wan-Yee Hui and Wei Thoo Yue, ‘Cyber Insurance and Risk 
Management: A Normative Analysis’, 14 November 2019, <https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3486658>, accessed 10 September 2020. 
75. James Hedlund, ‘Risky Business: Safety Regulations, Risk Compensation, and 
Individual Behavior’, Injury Prevention (Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2000), pp. 82–90. 
76. Woods and Moore, ‘Does Insurance Have a Future in Governing Cyber Security?’, 
p. 26. 
77. Ioannis Agrafiotis et al., ‘The Relative Effectiveness of Widely Used Risk Controls 
and the Real Value of Compliance’, Department of Computer Science, University 
of Oxford, 30 November 2016, <https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/files/8869/The_Relative_
Effectiveness_of_widely_used_Risk_Controls_and_the_Real_Val....pdf>, accessed 
9 November 2020. 
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cyber insurance.78 In the US, the topic of cyber insurance has been widely 
covered from a government perspective, with purchase advice available 
from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)79 and ongoing discussions by the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).80 The EU has also 
explored the utility of cyber insurance through reports into good practices81 
and recommendations to address challenges facing the industry.82
Finally, there are still doubts about how exactly the insurance industry should 
try to incentivise better security behaviours. Suggestions often include 
lowering premiums or deductibles for companies who comply with minimum 
security standards (such as achieving certification from Cyber Essentials, NIST 
CSF or a similar scheme). By linking a policy to an independent assessment, 
cyber insurance companies can then adjust premiums depending on the 
findings.83 Client organisations that do not have good cyber hygiene, or 
secure systems, would therefore face higher premiums.84 Meanwhile, in 
the event of a cyber incident, deductibles would be attached to the initial 
fixed price tags.85 Some argue that insurance companies have managed 
their risks with broad exclusion language that exempts them from paying 
out.86 One way to overcome these ambiguities could be for governments to 
recommend a minimum set of controls for an organisation to be eligible for 
cyber insurance.87
78. NCSC, ‘Cyber Insurance Guidance’. 
79. Federal Trade Commission, ‘Protecting Small Businesses’, <https://www.ftc.gov/
tips-advice/business-center/small-businesses>, accessed 30 November 2020.
80. CISA, ‘Cybersecurity Insurance’.
81. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), Cyber 
Insurance: Recent Advances, Good Practices and Challenges (Heraklion: ENISA, 2016).
82. ENISA, Commonality of Risk Assessment Language in Cyber Insurance: 
Recommendations on Cyber Insurance (Heraklion: ENISA, 2017).
83. Fabio Martinelli et al., ‘Preventing the Drop in Security Investments for  
Non-Competitive Cyber-Insurance Market’, in Nora Cuppens et al. (eds), Risks 
and Security of Internet and Systems (Dinard: CRiSIS, 2017), pp. 159–74; Nour 
Aburish, Annie Fixler and Michael Hsieh, ‘The Role of Cyber Insurance in Securing 
the Private Sector’, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 13 September 2019, 
<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/09/11/cyber-insurance/>, accessed  
10 September 2020.
84. Woods and Moore, ‘Does Insurance Have a Future in Governing Cybersecurity?’, 
p. 22. 
85. Gordon, Loeb and Sohail, ‘A Framework for Using Insurance for Cyber-Risk 
Management’, p. 83.
86. Forbes, ‘Cyber Insurance: A Study in Fine Print’, 14 August 2019, <https://www.
forbes.com/sites/insights-ibmresiliency/2019/08/14/cyber-insurance-a-study-in-
fine-print/?sh=492015ae2d58>, accessed 30 November 2020.
87. Cabinet Office, ‘Minimum Cyber Security Standard’, 25 June 2018, <https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-minimum-cyber-security-standard>, 
accessed 30 November 2020.
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HOW CAN CYBER INSURANCE LEARN FROM 
OTHER INSURANCE SECTORS?
Many of the problems facing cyber insurance are not unprecedented. Other 
sectors such as property, car, terrorism, health and maritime have had similar 
strategic challenges. Existing research into the challenges faced by other 
sectors could help the cyber insurance sector to draw on these experiences. 
Analysts often draw parallels between property, car and cyber insurance, 
owing to the comparable security requirements. For example, it would 
be difficult to purchase home insurance without providing evidence of a 
suitable lock on your front door. Similarly, it is not possible to purchase car 
insurance without a driving licence and almost impossible if a car does not 
have seatbelts.88 In addition, homeowners can qualify for reduced premiums 
by installing burglar alarms or introducing barriers, such as a high fence. 
Incentives are important too. Motorists are incentivised to drive safely 
partly due to the threat of increased premiums should they end up in an 
incident. Meanwhile, telematics (digital vehicle monitoring) enable insurers 
to monitor driver behaviour by sending both data and communications back 
and forth between a vehicle and a central management system.89 This way, 
insurance companies can adjust premiums in a proactive manner based on 
individual driver analytics. 
Terrorism insurance shares some similarities with cyber insurance. As both 
are man-made or anthropogenic risks, they share a level of unpredictability 
that natural disasters or fire do not have. As such, gathering consistent data 
is a challenge for both. This has led to uncertainty about the true scale of the 
risk that is being underwritten. Terrorism insurance was designed to meet 
unique needs and there was a significant shortage of industry expertise, 
as well as data to construct premiums, in the early days of the industry.90 
Some say that the purchase of terrorism insurance has often been driven by 
large incidents, similar to the way that large breaches drive uptake in cyber 
insurance.91 To add to the complexity, companies that purchase terrorism 
insurance also have a significant potential for an adverse selection problem 
similar to that for cyber insurance, in that companies that see the value 
in terrorism insurance may be disproportionately likely to suffer from 
terrorist attacks.92 
88. David Bjerklie, ‘The Hidden Dangers of Seat Belts’, Time, 30 November 2006. 
89. Mark Stevenson et al., ‘The Effects of Feedback and Incentive-Based Insurance 
on Driving Behaviours: Study Approach and Protocols’, Injury Prevention (Vol. 24, 
No. 1, 2018), pp. 89–93. 
90. Insurance Information Institute, ‘Background On: Terrorism Risk and Insurance’, 
16 December 2019, <https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-terrorism-risk-
and-insurance>, accessed 9 November 2020. 
91. DCMS, ‘Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2020’.
92. Gordon, Loeb and Sohail, ‘A Framework for Using Insurance for Cyber-Risk 
Management’, p. 82. 
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Following on from terrorist incidents in the 1990s and the significant 
impact of 9/11, the terrorism insurance industry realised that it had not 
fully accounted for the risk it was underwriting. This risk was recognised by 
governments who issued guarantees or provided financial backing for this 
type of insurance. In the UK, starting in the 1990s, the government issued a 
guarantee to Pool Re – a terrorism insurance company – that would cover 
any costs relating to a terrorist incident above a certain threshold.93 Similarly 
in the US, the government has created the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act to 
provide federal reinsurance to any property and casualty insurer who offers 
terrorism insurance.94 In doing so, it has agreed to reimburse insurers for a 
portion of losses of up to $100 billion on commercial policies.95 Governments 
could have a similar role in cyber insurance, owing to the potential fallout 
from a catastrophic cyber incident. 
Moral hazard is a significant challenge for the health insurance sector. 
Some individuals may neglect preventive care once they take out a policy,96 
thinking that their insurance policy will cover the cost of treating an illness.97 
This creates financial problems for insurers, as preventive care is often less 
expensive than the cost of treating a serious condition later on.98 It also has 
a detrimental effect for the purchaser, who could undergo a lengthy hospital 
stay or worse.99 A parallel problem in cyber security is when companies do 
not spend money on cyber defence because they assume that the insurance 
company will compensate them in the event of an incident.100 The health 
insurance industry has spent a great deal of time looking into the problem 
of moral hazard. Through an investigation into the methods that they use, 
insurers could be informed about how to better incentivise cyber-related 
preventive measures among purchasers of cyber insurance. 
Encouraging healthy individuals to purchase health insurance is also an 
enduring challenge. The rollout of the US’s Affordable Care Act revealed 
that many young and healthy individuals often failed to purchase health 
insurance.101 Some young individuals, without pre-existing conditions, felt 
93. Daniel M Hoffman, ‘Advancing Accumulation Risk Management in Cyber 
Insurance: Prerequisites for the Development of a Sustainable Cyber Risk 
Insurance Market’, The Geneva Association, August 2018, p. 20.
94. Congressional Budget Office, ‘Federal Reinsurance for Terrorism Risk: An 
Update’, January 2015, p. 1.
95. Ibid. 
96. Hui, Hui and Yue, ‘Cyber Insurance and Risk Management’, p. 3.
97. Ibid. 
98. R L Kane et al., ‘Economic Incentives for Preventive Care: Summary’, Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, August 2004, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK11845/>, accessed 9 November 2020. 
99. Ibid. 
100. Hui, Hui and Yue, ‘Cyber Insurance and Risk Management’, p. 3.
101. Samyukta Mullangi, A Mark Fendrick and Kavita Patel, ‘How to Persuade the Young 
and the Healthy to Sign Up for Health Insurance’, Harvard Business Review,  
18 January 2018. 
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that they were not exposed to the risks that health insurance is intended 
to offset. Balanced against the expense of a premium, these individuals 
concluded that the cost savings are of greater benefit than the low health 
risk. However, this lack of uptake raises premiums elsewhere. In this 
scenario, only high-risk individuals, with the potential for expensive medical 
expenses, purchase health insurance. Consequently, insurers are unable 
to offset pay-outs for high-risk cases against the premiums of low-risk 
individuals.102 Cyber insurance has similar gaps with uptake where many 
companies do not feel that the risk is high enough to warrant the purchase 
of insurance. Also, there is an argument that the more a company spends on 
its own risk-mitigation practices, the less motivation they have to subsidise 
the poor risk-management practices of others. To increase uptake, the 
health insurance sector focuses on education and awareness campaigns 
and adjusts premiums and deductibles to better suit the needs of a 
low-risk customer.103 Such campaigns may be applicable to the cyber 
insurance industry as well.
Maritime insurance is one of the oldest classes of insurance on the market. 
Historically, insurers have worked with the maritime industry to mitigate and 
manage the risk. It is an iterative process depending on the context at the 
time. For example, insurers may study ship construction and pirate attack 
patterns.104 In the early 1900s, insurance companies intervened to study the 
risks caused by boiler explosions.105 More recently, maritime insurance has 
had to contend with the risks posed by increases in piracy.106 As the maritime 
insurance industry has such a long and well-explored history, there may be 
processes or lessons that can be applied to emerging insurance sectors, 
such as cyber insurance.
Kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance also forms another pertinent class of 
insurance that shares some similarities with cyber. This is driven especially 
by the recent proliferation of ransomware attacks over the past 24 
months targeting a range of organisations from hospitals to businesses,107 
and even some insurers.108 K&R policies have been seen to cover 
102. Ibid. 
103. Ibid. 
104. Ariel E Levite, Scott Kannry and Wyatt Hoffman, ‘Addressing the Private Sector 
Cybersecurity Predicament: The Indispensable Role of Insurance’, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, October 2018, p. 11. 
105. Ibid. 
106. Costas Lambrou, ‘The Implications of Piracy on Marine Insurance: Some 
Considerations for the Shipowner’, WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs (Vol. 11, 2012), 
pp. 129–41. 
107. Dustin Volz and Robert McMillan, ‘Hackers Hit Hospitals in Disruptive 
Ransomware Attack’, Wall Street Journal, 29 October 2020.
108. Sergiu Gatlan, ‘Ransomware Hits US-Based J. Gallagher Insurance Giant’, 
Bleeping Computer, 29 September 2020, <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/
news/security/ransomware-hits-us-based-arthur-j-gallagher-insurance-giant/>, 
accessed 30 November 2020.
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ransoms, response consultancy services, fees for negotiators and more.109 
These are the same activities now central in cases of ransomware attacks; 
therefore, there are undoubtedly many lessons that can be learnt from this 
insurance domain.
The direct connection between the incentives used by other insurance 
sectors to increase uptake and cyber insurance requires further enquiry. This 
section has merely listed some of the approaches taken by other sectors. 
For this ongoing research project, primary research into the approaches of 
other insurance sectors could identify what exact interventions the cyber 
insurance market could successfully mirror. 
IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS
Based on this paper, ICCI project members will perform primary research 
into the ways in which cyber insurance may be helpful in incentivising 
companies to improve their cyber security systems and risk-management 
practices. Full recommendations will be presented in a research paper due 
for publication in March 2021, which will propose specific and actionable 
policy recommendations. In doing so, the project seeks to inform and 
complement the existing work being conducted by the UK government on 
how cyber security incentives and regulation can overcome existing barriers 
to improving cyber security practices.110 Project members expect that 
there are also wider applications of this research beyond the UK, and that 
findings will also be able to complement and provide additional insights to 
governments and practitioners in the US, EU and Asia.
The following policy questions have emerged from the preliminary stages of 
this research project, based on an extensive literature review. They set the 
stage for the project’s continuing investigation into cyber security incentives 
and the role of cyber insurance: 
• What is the role of the cyber insurance market in the context of cyber 
risk management for large, medium and small organisations? 
109. Gallagher, ‘Kidnap and Ransom Insurance’, <https://www.ajg.com/uk/corporate-
insurance/crisis-management/kidnap-and-ransom-insurance/>, accessed 
30 November 2020; AIG, ‘Crisis Solution’, <https://www.aig.co.uk/business-
insurance/innovative-products/business-insurance-products/financial-lines/
kidnap-ransom-extortion>, accessed 30 November 2020; Beazley, ‘Kidnap and 
Ransom’, <https://www.beazley.com/london_market/political_risks_and_
contingency/kidnap_and_ransom.html>, accessed 30 November 2020.
110. These barriers are: the lack of ability to manage cyber risks, the complexity of 
digital environments and the lack of commercial rationale to invest in cyber 
security practices. See DCMS, ‘Cyber Security Incentives & Regulation Review: 
Summary of Responses to the Call for Evidence’, 27 August 2020.
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• To what extent can cyber insurance companies act to incentivise 
better cyber security practices and systems within businesses? What, 
if any, are the conditions required for this to occur?
• To what extent can cyber insurance negatively influence cyber security 
practices or systems in businesses (for example, how real is the issue 
of moral hazard or concerns such as the ‘race to the bottom’)? 
• If cyber insurance can have a positive impact on businesses, how can 
the positive influences be best championed? 
• What is the role of government in maximising any positive 
impacts of cyber security from cyber insurance? How could it 
alleviate any concerns? 
• Are there other insurance classes that may provide lessons for the 
cyber insurance ecosystem, particularly as it relates to influencing 
better risk-management behaviours?
• Are there differences in the way cyber insurers approach assessing 
risk and underwriting policies? If so, do different approaches have 
different impacts on cyber security practices?
Through an exploration of these questions, the ICCI project aims to provide 
valuable insight for policymakers currently seeking ways to optimise the 
potential impact of cyber insurance on cyber security. Improving cyber 
security across society will generate positive outcomes, not only for the 
organisations, but for whole-of-society resilience. 
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